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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE INSUR;\N(;E COMPANY,
Plain tiff-Respondent,
- vs -

JAMES E. CAINE, dba CAINE AGENCY
Defendant-Appellant'.

Case No.
10940

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This ts an action for moneys allegedly advanced, moneys collected and not paid to Respondent Insurance Company by Appellant Caine, and
related miscellaneous charges which Respondent
claimed were due him from the Appellant in
the sum of $6,762.73, after deducting all credits due
Appellant from Respondent, and which arose from
ri. life insurance agency contract between the parties
herein. Appellant's counterclaim is an action for an
uccounting, which Respondent has not furnished
tc Appellant, although such was provided for in the
written contract between the parties, to determine the amounts due Appellant from Respondent.
In conjunction with such accounting, and its de-
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termination, it was necessary for the court to
determine any breaches of this contract, and which
party was responsible therefore.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\A.TER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a judqment for the Respondent in the sum of $6,762.73
Appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision oi
the court in whole, or in part, in awarding this
money judgment on the grounds that there is no
evidence anywhere in the record to sustain this
judgment and there is no evidence to support the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by
the court. Appellant also seeks to have the case
remanded to the lower court for further considera·
tion of the evidence referred to, but never completed nor submitted, or in the alternative, for a new
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Frank B. Salisbury, president of Responder.t
company, became acquainted with James E. Caine,
a life insurance salesman, in December 1955 and
negotiated a written contract with him, dated Feb·
ruary 1, 1956 wherein Caine was hired as Agency
Supervisor for Reliance Life Insurance Company,
hereafter referred to as Reliance (Exh. P-1). The con-
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tract was written by Mr. Salisb1Jry, and contained
] 9 provisions, of which two are of vital interest hern,
together with testimony that an accounting to Caine
was mandatory in order to enable him to know the
extent of his earnings, because of the complicated
nature of this insurance company's records. (R 142,
143).
The agreement continued until late July or early
August 1956 at which time a series of charges and
counter-charges and recriminations between Salisbury and Ca_ine resulted, on August 20th, 1956 with
Mr. Caine resigning from all of his duties v.rith Reliance (Exh. P-3). The resignation was accepted, and
Caine was next heard from later that year in Nevada
where he set up an Insurance company. At lhe time
Caine left Reliance, or shortly thereafter, seven
agents of Reliance also left the company (R 75).
Some of them apparently joined Caine, in Nevada,
others did not. (R 88, 111, 112, 113). One employee of
Reliance testified that he had heard Caine, before
August 20th, 1956, mention to a group of salesmen
"that there was money in Nevada, no Blue Sky law,"
and some comment about starting a company there.
(R 92). Another employee testified that each agent
received a statement each month from Reliance
concerning his accounts, and that Caine had never
complained that his statements were incorrect (R
145). One of the seven agents who reportedly left
the company when Caine did testified that he resiqned at least three weeks before Caine did because Salisbury, president of Reliance kept cutting
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down his salary, and over-writes, or both when he
made too much money, telling him, "You are making more than the President of the company."
(R 135). This agent, a Mr. Dedmore, admitted that he
later went to work for Caine, in Navada and elsewhere, but denied that he was ever solicited b111
Caine before quitting Reliance. (R 82, 83)
At the end of the August 20th, 1956 trial, the attorney for Reliance stated he was going to submit
a deposition from a Mr. Mortensen, concerning the
going into business in Nevada and then wanted tc
meet with Caine's counsel to prepare a few interrogatories on the special issues to be found from
the evidence. (R 166).
Of interest is the fact that nowhere in this 110
page transcript of the .August 20th trial are any references to the commissions due Caine, or the advances due back to Reliance, nor is such contained
in any of the five exhibits admitted in evidence at
the trial. nor in the other two exhibits proposed by
Caine, but not offered (R 24).
Also of interest is that the deposition of Mr.
Mortensen, taken by Reliance on August 22, 1960,
was nowhere ever offered in evidence, nor ordered
opened by the Court and published. (R ____ __). Another deposition, of one Joseph Ashton Cosby, was
never taken with notice to the Court, was never offered in evidence, nor ordered opened by the Courl
and published. However, each of these depositions.
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according to the Register of Writs book were opened. Too, they were considered by the Court and the
counsel for the parties. (R_ ______ J
Caine has endeavored to bring to the Supreme
Court, in this appeal, the total record for the Court's
information to determine whether the Memorandum
Decision of the Judge of the lower court, and the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgement are supported by the evidence and the record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THE TWO DEPOSITIONS IN ITS DECISION, AND THE
TESTIMONIES GIVEN THEREIN, BECAUSE OF ITS
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 30, UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, WHICH PERTAINS TO DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION.

Rule 30 (f) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states in part that the officer who swears in the witness and certifies concerning the deposition "shall
then securely seal the deposition in an envelope
indorsed with the title of the action and marked
"Deposition of (the witness)" and shall promptly
file it with the court in which the action is pendino
or send it by registered mail to the clerk thereof for
filing."
According to the Register of Actions Book these
Depositions of August 8 and August 22, 1960 were
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not r~ceived by the Court until January 5th, 1961,
and they were "not sealed" according to the entry
of such Register. (R _________ __).
Further, it has been the time-honored procedure
in Utah Courts that after being sealed, the deposition shall be opened only by order of the Court,
or by the Court's direction. Ordinarily, it is not permissible to open a deposition out of court, and b
do so may render it inadmissable for all purposes.
23 Am. Jur 2d, "Depositions," (84). If the trial court
received and read these two depositions, counsel
for each party should have had an opportunity to rebut, clarify, or challenge such testimony. Nothing in
the record indicates whether this was done. On the
basis of the trial transcript alone, there seems to be
no preponderance of the evidence that Caine per·
suaded any of Reliance's agents to quit, or to have
any assured's cancel their policies with Reliance,
which would have invoked the forfeiture clause in
Caine's contract. If the depositions were used to advise the Court in this regard, there is no indication
of it anywhere in the record. These depositions were
taken after the trial of August 1st, 1960, but apparently were referred to in some later hearing or meet·
ing before the Court, although the Clerk of the Court
did not receive them until January 5th, 1961. (R ----- _).
In Defendant's Statement of Case, dated November
23, 1960, he refers to the deposition of Mr. Cosby
and points out certain weaknesses in the testimony
he gave (R 29). He also plays down the depositioi1
statements of Mr. Mortenson as relates to C1)ne hav
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ing persuaded him to quit his job with Reliance.
(R 30).
The counsel for Reliance, in Plaintiff's Statement of Case, also dated November 23, 1960, also
referred to Mr. Cosby's deposition (R 33) in contending that Caine induced the agents to leave Re- ·
liance.
Perhaps counsel for each side used the information in the depositions referred to, without knowledge of the trial court; or perhaps they were used
in conjunction with some hearing before the Court,
or maybe they were properly ordered published by
th8 Court. The point is, there is nothing in the record
to indicate what if anything, was done in this regard, and this was error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT AGAINST CAINE FOR $6,762. WITH NO
ACCOUNTING RECORDS, NO TESTIMONY AS TO
THE CONCLUSION REACHED, AND NO EVIDENCE
OF ANY TYPE, KIND OR DESCRIPTION AS TO HOW
THIS MONEY JUDGMENT WAS DETERMINED.

There is no information in the transcript of the
trial of August 1st, 1956 to indicate how the trial
court determined that Caine owed Reliance $6,762.
There are no accounting records, nor statements,
anywhere in the file of the case, nor indicated in
the Register of Actions Book that any evidence was
ever offered or received in support of this amount,
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or any other sum.
In the Defendant's Statement of Case, dated
November 23, 1960 and flled with the Court on January 5, 1961, Caine's former counsel contends that
an audit by a C.P.A. firm indicated that $8,42l .76
was owed to the defendant Caine from Reliance,
"based uoon defendant's interpretation of the exis1ing contracts." (R 27 & 28).
In Plaintiff's Statement of Case, also dated November 23. and filed Januarv 5 the followin0
year, the counsel for Reliance stated that it had introduced its records into evidence showing tha~
Caine owed Reliance $6,762, but adds, however,
"The a_udit of defendant's (Caine) account with
plaintiff (Relia.nce) f-urnished by Richmond, Jones E
Anderson shows that plaintiff is indebted to defendant. Counsel for Reliance then picks out fivP
statements in the C.P.A. accour.tinq under discussion to show it is not as accurate as that of the insurance company. He also refers to a "Schedule 2
0.tk_ched" to explain huw the commission was computed. Ho\flrever, there is no Schedule 2 attached,
nor any other schedule. (R 33, 34 & 35). Nor is there
anvthing in the record to indicate that such sched
ul~ was ever submitted, or submitted and withdrawn.
POINT III
WHEN THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE
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TN A LAW CASE TO WARRANT THE FINDINGS OF
FACT AND DECISION, THE SUPREME COURT MAY
INTERFERE AND HOLD THE FINDINGS AND DE\ISION VOID.

Rule 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states
that an appeal in an equity case may be on questions of both law and fact. In cases at law, the appeal
shall be on questions of law only. However, the conclusiveness of verdicts and findings is always open
to review. by the Supreme Court, if the findings and
judgment are not supported by the evidence. And,
if the findings or judgment are so manifestly erroneous as to indicate oversight, or mistake, which
affects the substantial rights of the appellant, the
Supreme Court has full power to set aside such
judgment. McKay v. Farr, 15 Utah 261, 49 Pac. 649
1897. Klopenstine vs. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 Pac. 712,
1899. Elliot vs. Whitmore, 23 Utah 342, 65 Pac. 70,
1901. 90 Am. St. Rep. 700.
Our Supreme Court has held in other law cases
thi'\t when there is no competent evidence to warrant a finding of fact which materially affects rights
of litigant, that the Suoreme Court will interfere and
hold the finding nugatory and void. Whittaker vs.
Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 Pac 980, 1898. Especially
so where there is entire absence of supporting
proof, as in the instant case, relating to the $6,762.
judgment. Wild v. Union Pacific R. Co., 23 Utah 265,
63 P. 886, 1901.
In the case of Jensen vs. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282
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Pac. 1034, 1929, our Supreme Court reversed the
findings of a trial court where it was manifest tha.t
the findings were so clearly against the weight of
evidence as to indicate a misconception, or not a
due consideration of it. In other Utah cases, such as
In Re Yowell's Estate., 75 Utah 312, 285 Pac. 28.S,
1930, for example, our Supreme Court has rightly
held that it will not interfere in such cases unless
the findings are so manifestly against the clear
weight of evidence as to indicate it was not fairly
or impartially considered by the Court below, or
that portions of it were arbitrarily rejected or disregarded, or that undue weight was given other portions of the evidence, or that the trial court misconceived or misapplied the evidence, or was influenced through prejudice or bias. However, in the
entire absence of supporting proof, the Court is free
to examine, not only the evidence, but the entire
record. (Whittaker case supra).
In the instant case there is some novelty because of the extent of time from the commencement
of this action by Reliance in October 1956 to the oneday trial August 1st, 1960. There are tvventy entries
prior to the trial date, as shown in the Register of
Actions book which indicates diligence on the part
of the advocates of the causes. There are approximately fifteen additional entries in the Register of
Actions Book commencing after the trial date of
August 1st, 1960 to and including the present time.
(R
). On March 21st, 1966, Judge Hanson again
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continued the case for further hearing, without date.
When counsel for the parties met with the Court on
March 21st, 1966, it was noted then that the record
was incomplete. Neither the trial court Judge nor
his court reporter could find entries of other hear~ngs, or of evidence, or documents submitted after
a diligent search of their own records. However, no
further action was taken by either side and in Apnl,
1967, counsel for Mr. Caine filed a motion to reopen the case or to permit him to file Final Papers
in:ismuch as counsel for Reliance had failed to do
so. A few days after filing the Motion, counsel for
Reliance filed the Judgment, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law herein. (R 47, 48, 49,50, 51 & 52).
From these Findings and Judgment the appeal was
taken bv counsel for Caine in May, 1967.
Appellant Caine does not contend that there
w:is bics. fraud nor discrimination by the Court in
this matter but does contend that the evidence and
rE:cords needed to uphold the Findings and the
Judgment are absent as supporting proof. Because
of this fact and a hesita.ncy by both parties and the
Cour1 to go forward with additional hearings, because of the incomplete record, it is believed by
the Appellant, at leas+, that a review of the matter
by the?- SuDreme Court and its subsequent directive
or order would enable this action to be concluded
in lhe foreseeable future, one way or the other.
In 5 Am Jur 2d, "Appeal and Error" paragraph
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841 is laid down the general principle that a finding
of fact will be not be supported on appeal if it is
clearly against the weight or the preponderance of
the evidence, or if it is not supported by any "substantial" evidence, or is clearly erroneous, or not
supported by any reasonable view, taken of the
evidence. Cited in support of this view are numerous cases including Jackson vs. Jackson, 201 Okla
292, 205 P 2d 297 (1949) and Mugaas vs. Smith, 33
Wash 2d 429, 206 P 2d 332 (1949). Also cited in support of this proposition is Van Voast vs. Blaine Coun·
ty, 118 Mont 395, 167 P 2d 572 (1946) and Dillard v.
McKnight, 34 Cal 2d 209, 209 P 2d 387. A Washington case, Lassiter vs. Guy F. Atkinson Company, (CA
9 Wash) 176 F 2d 984 (1949) held that, If, on the entire
evidence, the appellate court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, it has the duty to reverse the trial court's finding.
The discussion in Am Jur further states than an appellate court always has the power to examine
whether the Findings of Fact of the Court below are
supported by competent evidence. If it is not, it will
set aside the judgment of the trial judge where the
facts as determined by him fail to support his legal
conclusions drawn from them. In support of this
case is Italian-American Bank vs. Carosella, 81 Colo
214, 254 Pac 771 (1927).
In his Defendant's Statement of Case, dated November 23rd, 1960, the then counsel for Caine
stated "no evidence was introduced by either side
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touching _upon the amount owed by or to either
party." (R 27). In the same Statement of November
23rd, counsel for defendant Caine states that when
certain questions have been determined by the
Court, that within ten days plaintiff would provide
the defendant with a statement of account, based
upon the rulings of the court. (R 32). The parties,
in a five page stipulation of the same date, joined
in asking the Court to rule on certain questions
after which Reliance, within ten days, would provide Caine with a statement of accounts based on
the rulings of the court.
However, the trial judge either overlooked or
ignored the request of counsel for both parties to
have certain questions determined by the Court
and issued his memorandum decision on January
5, 1961. The substance of this decision was later incorporated into the Findings and the Judgment of
the Court. (R 25 & 26: 47-52). The Findings and Judgment provided for the $6,672 award to Reliance, invoked the forfeiture provision and stated that any
prior breach by Reliance would not bar the application of such forfeiture provision. Of note is the
fact that the judge relies on the "Depositions submitted with the statements of the parties" in reaching his decision. (R 25). In his decision the Court required that Reliance pay the costs of the accounting
work done, because it had never been completed
and furnished to Cain, as required by the contract
but no amount was set out by the judge in his de-
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cision although the findings and judgment set up
the sum of $675 which had been determined as due
and owing to the date of the August 1st, 1960 trial
for accounting services, but which were not yet
complete as of that time because of the need to have
certain questions determined by the Court. (R 48
50, 51, 166). At the August 1st. 1960 trial, the judg~
proposed $695. as a reasonable accounting fee. (R
166).
CONCLUSION
If one consults the Register of Actions Book or
any other part of the Record here, there is no testimony, evidence nor exhibits indicated to sustain
this money judgment against Caine for the sum ol
$6,762.73.
If one refers to the transcript of the trial, in and
of itself, it is highly doubtful whether the evidence
therein and testimony given warrants the invoking
of the forfeiture provision of Caine's contract with
Reliance. The Judge in his Memorandum Decision
rl2ced emphasis on the testimony from the two
depositions which were persuasive to him that the
forfeiture clause should be applied. Caine contends
that nowhere in the Record is there any indication
that either or both of these depositions were properly authenticated, introduced nor rebutted, nor was
he provided the opportunity to discredit these depositions.

In the event that the testimony given at the
trial justifies invoking the forfeiture clause, clarifica-
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tion is needed as to when and whether commissions
Caine had earned, but not been paid, up to the time
of his resignation would still be due and owing to
h1m. Because these matters are not supported by the
preponderance of the evidence and because of the
total lack of accounting records to provide the basis
for any money judgment, and because these depos1 t1ons, according to the record were never introduced, properly or otherwise, this cause should be
reversed, or remanded, or a new trial ordered. In
the alternative the trial court should be directed to
cure the record of the August 1, 1960 trial, and permit the parties to properly introduce the evidence
and records needed to determine what relief should
be given to Caine and Reliance, or either, and to
clarify the previous decision of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
MERRILL K. DAVIS
72 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for DefendantAppellant

